On Forgiveness: The Individual Represents The State

I seem to find myself saying that we need to give love and then having to explain what that means, so I may as well start with it. Love is moral consciousness, that being loving is having the awareness and the need to create what is both right and good to all. Each time I wanted to write about forgiveness, it felt inappropriate as though I were not allowed considering that I still felt resentment, still fought with people, or that people thought I was bad or weird and therefore I did not have the authority to discuss such a subject. To be angry is wrong or as the Stoics believe ungoverned anger begets madness, and while the idea that anger and love are mutually exclusive, is there no such thing as injustice? The term humanity explains our capacity for benevolence, propriety and loving-kindness, but there are crimes against humanity and gross injustice that demonstrates our capacity for evil, to look the other way, to hate or abuse those who are vulnerable. There are many layers to anger, one being the socially constructed character where ‘masculinity’ is defined by this permission to display aggression while ‘feminine’ is restraining such emotions, thus when a woman displays anger she becomes ‘crazy’ because of this contrast just as much as a quiet man is labelled cowardly. The other is anger as primitive, egotistic, an unauthored state of mind that rises like steam in the heat of the moment from the reservoir of our deepest emotions and fears especially when we lose control, giving us a false sense of empowerment. Does a person scream because they seek to display power and dominate the situation, or do they scream because they feel they are not being heard or acknowledged?

 

The Individual


Unrequited feelings of rejection is one thing, but having the person that you have feelings for mistreat you is another. The hurt is considerable. I felt incredibly small and worthless, shrinking into the shadows that it soon became clear that my life was withering away.  ‘Stop. Leave me alone,’ I would mutter in desperation when his taunting became unbearable. I could no longer fight against all the games he played and the pretending he did that quite simply broke my heart. I needed him gone so the hurt could go with him. He was another monster in a series of people who had let me down, including my father. My father was a very aggressive man and his aggression stemmed purposefully because he was raised in an environment that told him how he should treat women, his wife and children and his fellow men and my father was the type to do what he was told. It is unfortunate that in the Turkish culture that he grew up in, what he was told to do were all wrong and where masculinity and ‘being a man’ were defined by your capacity for violence. The survival of the fittest. He often ruminated, however, how much he wished to have been educated and you could see deep within him that longing to shatter the chains of the cultural repression that forced him to be a monster and normalised and accepted his bad behaviour.

My mother could never tell my father that he was a monster that she instead took her aggression out on me and she would always do this when no one was around to witness her behaviour. Words like ‘slut’ and ‘bitch’ were hurled in my direction, opinions like ‘you are worthless’ and ‘never come to my funeral when I die’ were consistently launched before she would go to my father and others and claim that I abused her. I was mistreated and then blamed as though I deserved the mistreatment. It was much worse from my siblings who constantly taunted and belittled me in much the same manner, my eldest brother violent and my sisters cruel. I was ugly, stupid and had no purpose in life other than to serve and as this occurred from such a young age being the youngest in my family, I came to believe it. Violence is both physical and psychological.

It is incredibly difficult finding dignity and self-respect when people directly or indirectly tell you that you are not good enough and it is especially worse when it comes from the people that you love or admire, from your parents or siblings, your lover and your friends. We are taught from a young age that receiving any love or approval is conditional, that we need to obey and do what we are told, that right and wrong behaviour is defined by others, to make decisions and appear a certain way that is approved of by society that our identity is determined by this approval. We build on that, our efforts become all about performing the best according to what our environment dictates, to appear popular and congratulated and so we work hard trying to receive the love from others. When others tell us we are good, that must mean that we are good. When others tell us we are bad, we must be bad. It is about quantity, the more people like us or agree with us then we become more right and more worthy.

But what happens to our identity within all of this, what happens when we realise that all our efforts are simply trying to get other people to tell us we are good and it does not matter how artificial we are in our attempt to attain this? Do we exist, or is our real identity a Jungian ‘shadow’ or the unknown part of our personality that even we don’t completely understand? To realise that we – who we really are – does not actually matter, we come to see that our efforts is vanity, our relationships artificial, and that we are in fact alone because you cannot satisfy something that is insatiable. That is, within that existential nightmare where hedonism and aggression are suddenly permitted, can people recognise who we really are, can love – moral consciousness – be possible? If so, if we create meaning consciously and if our humanity is dependent on our moral fibre, how do we reach out and find that capacity to work against the grain? How can we give, rather than try to receive, love?

The State


In Plato’s The Republic, Socrates explains the individual soul by dividing its purpose into a triptych of 1. rational, 2. emotional and 3. instinctual or the appetites that compel us to pursue our desires. The analogy of the soul is an attempt to demonstrate that while we have those three functions, an individual is capable of being just or moral when they can find an equilibrium or balance between all three. This psychological account of the subjective self is similar to the Freudian division of the psyche, that to repress or restrain our desires can lead to a tumorous pathology elsewhere. Socrates further explains that the soul of the individual or what makes the individual capable of being just is aligned in similar vein to the function of a city or a state. Thus the individual represents the state; murder and mass murder function in much the same way, but on a larger scale.

The Palestinian/Israeli conflict epitomises continuity of aggression and violence and with the diplomatic difficulties between both parties when attempting to find a solution, forgiveness at political level becomes all the more difficult. Following the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, the United Kingdom gained administrative control of Palestine under the 1922 mandate that formalised British rule in the region by the League of Nations. The violence between Jews and Palestinians occurred at this time as decisions of who will sovereign the region became announced as discussions on the subject ensued. Palestinians were ignored until the British finally announced that it will be a place for Jewish settlement at a time where the Jews themselves were – through Germany and the holocaust – required protection. It did not help that Palestinian leadership under al-Husseini decided to strengthen relations with Germany, a British enemy at the time. When World-War II was over and the United Nations forged, the General Assembly Resolution 181 (II) Future Government of Palestine was articulated as a way to divide the territories into what is known as the two-state solution, something that continues to be rejected by Palestinians. At the time, it was largely rejected by the Arab world that led to Arab-Israeli wars of 1948 and 1967, the former leading to ‘The Catastrophe’ or An-Nakba that resulted in what remains the longest refugees without a homeland in the world.

What happens to the identity of the Palestinians in all of this? The lack of acknowledgement, impoverished without proper leadership and guidance? The rise of the Palestinian Liberation Authority further perpetuated the anger and aggression, where the conditions within the occupied territories worsened to a point of leading to several ‘Intifida‘ or an attempt to remove the powerful grip that Israel had on the Palestinian people. In the context of international law, sovereignty is limited to a state with geographical boundaries, recognised by other states as having stable governance and a capacity for diplomatic relations defined by a permanent population or citizenship. Israel has successfully done this and have the right to be there, but symbolically they continue to struggle justifying – other than through a historical and religious context – their reason to be there. They have adequately and successfully developed a stable polity and society but borne out of aggression and violence such as building settlements in illegal territories. The victim – the Palestinians – are socially and politically in disarray and without adequate leadership and proper legislative boundaries that enable a ‘natural balance’ of the political soul to form a just society, factional differences such as that between Hamas and Fatah will continue to cause delays in reconciliation. They are left with the symbolic right to determination without any practical or organised capacity in our contemporary legal definition of statehood.

 

 

To Fight The Good Fight


 

How do you proceed when you have been hurt so much? How do you find forgiveness? When I experienced the violence both verbally and emotionally, that feeling of emptiness and heart-ache made it difficult for me to function adequately. I was sad and emotional. I lost a lot of weight and became very sick. I had to take care of myself through the difficulties and that resilience through the mental and physical difficulties is hard, because as the victim you should not be the one making the effort to improve. You took it from me and I want it back from you. Until I was able to find that inner voice and function with a healthy mindset, forgiveness within an unstable and unsettled subjectivity is impossible. As Tracy Chapman perfectly said, “unsettled hearts promise what they can’t deliver.” When I reflected on most of the hurt that I experienced from others, from those who were responsible to care for me and those who were irresponsible as people while my own personal life was in disarray, I was not able to see things objectively.

It was only after this, after having lost so much and building myself up again through all the hurt that I was able to understand why my parents and others mistreated me. They have the same pressure as everyone else, to work for and try and impress the people in their social environment or culture in order to gain their approval and recognition so as to form that meaning and identity. While they were making every effort to be recognised by their society, they were failing and became resentful themselves, attacking others in this highly competitive social dynamic thinking that by bringing other people down, they can climb up higher and feel greater worth. It is an artificial sense of empowerment where they feel some control because they feel they have no control. They become destructive and cannot articulate or explain their frustrations because they simply do not understand it.

Just like capitalism, aggression is as Rousseau claims, namely that people are good by nature but are corrupted by society. The Judeo-Christian concept of evil is this considering it opposes authenticity in moral consciousness and thus evil is our failure to think for ourselves and this is the root of our aggression and hatred. The narration by Jesus that “small is the gate and narrow the road that leads to life, and only a few find it” is an explanation of just how difficult it is to recognise yourself and overcome the anxiety of letting go of social norms that stops you from ever finding the capacity to create meaning for yourself. It is in morality and creativity that meaning can be formed and why Kant concludes God as necessary (although I actually believe in the existence of God). It does not, however, suddenly mean those who have mistreated and wronged me are no longer responsible for their actions given the fact that they are ignorant.

I realised that I first needed to apologise to myself, to forgive myself for failing to find my own voice, my own identity through all that I had experienced. Despite the difficulties, when I reflect I see that most of the struggles that I endured were really my own self-defence mechanisms refusing to let go and move forward. Acknowledgement is something that is given and I needed to acknowledge myself through the echoes of all the hateful comments and attacks and transcend all that to appreciate myself and find that dignity and self-respect. To give love does not suddenly exclude you, you too are as much a part of humanity as anyone else and that enabled me to see me as a part of the world around me, to recognise and appreciate my consciousness and freedom to create what is beautiful; that is, what is good. I began to commit myself to helping people as I was taking care of myself at the same time, learning and increasing my knowledge or as said in Isaiah, “lengthen your cords, strengthen your stake.” I am still learning and I have indeed a great deal to learn, but it is a process that creates and improves, something aggression cannot do.

In doing so, I recognise all the suffering my mother went through, and I began to feel compassion for my mother and can see why she struggled, what she experienced and went through, all her hardship. It does not change that she wronged me, but I found forgiveness as though I could see a little girl in my mother and despite the tantrums, I wanted to hug her and kiss her. I saw in my father the intensity of the constructs of masculinity coerced by his environment that obstructed his genuine identity and a little boy afraid that he is not strong enough in a violent society that continuously threatened him and suddenly I wanted to embrace him and read him a book, to keep him safe from that harmful and toxic culture. Despite my father’s violence toward me and my mother, even he deserves the acknowledgement and by giving both of them that acknowledgement without giving up on me but that together we are a part of something bigger, the attitude of forgiveness is solutions-focused, forward or future-thinking to improve a situation and something aggression will never do.

Palestinians need to improve their government and themselves through the hostility and aggression, that despite the symbolic right to the land and a past laden with violence, they need to work through the reality that Israel is there and there to stay, to form a solid government toward the formation of a recognised state as accepted by international law. Palestinians need to acknowledge Israel and the Jewish people, however hard that may be. There is an absence of rationally defensible moral ideals that has made reconciliation and the effort to overcome the resentment in the region difficult. Working through the numerous issues takes time, but the primary effort relies on the Palestinians despite being the victims. They will then see with justice the reasons why Israel exists, why they needed to form a homeland, the history of the Jewish people and the reasons for their hostility. In the process, however, their conditions will improve and justice will be established. Love is something that we give and justice is something we create.

 

 

 

Turnbull and Privacy of Information: A Deliberate Attempt To Prevent Open Governance?

Whilst Australian politics certainly appears lacklustre in comparison to the complications and political machinations of a number of global powers and a challenge of which I am naturally compelled, nevertheless Australia has and will always remain a country – insofar as human rights and law is concerned – that I am proud of and have an inherent respect for, regularly comparing  when researching or thinking about international relations as a whole. But it is not without its embarrassing moments, no doubt influenced by factious relations whether from powerful industry moguls or promoters of international conservatism. While I was happy to see Tony Abbott ousted, my fears that Malcolm Turnbull – being one who has public support – would cause Australians to overlook the fact that the Liberal Party contains a significant number of policies that have and continue to work against the improvement of Australian civil society. Being one more inclined to the judicial rather than executive elements of public policy, the first budget release of the Liberal government during the rather short period of Abbottism that cut funding for the Office of the Australian Information Commissioner [OAIC] proved that an intentional challenge against the very heart of the Australian Constitution appears to exist. Since the OAIC remains a legal entity, the intent of the Abbott government’ proposed abolition uniformly contradicts statutory obligations vis-à-vis section 61 of the Australian Constitution[1] in that to simply bring a legal entity to an end independent of parliament is to usurp the constitutional role of parliament itself, since only the latter has the right to legislate accordingly. This act against the OAIC raises manifold issues particularly with legislative and executive functions and the required separation of powers, the composition of the ministries and ultimately the impact such an implementation of executive powers in defiance to legislative obligations can have on the future of human rights in Australia. The Freedom of Information Act [FOI] itself was established to ensure the principle of an open and accountable government and ultimately the health of Australian democracy without polluting the overall objective of the constitution that gives people the ultimate control of the government.

Are we living in an age where privacy is no longer paramount to our individual happiness? There are complex, dynamic and swift system and processes readily available that can easily locate the details of any one. If one knows how to look, the system of finding private information is not as difficult even for a common person. So imagine that when you make your information on social media public, the technically advanced algorithms and programming can detect that information and combine it with other information in order to establish and predict private, even sensitive information. You google “prams” and suddenly every page you visit has various baby retailers and the more information one is able to attain, the more accurate the predictability. If social networking sites wanted to advantageously use the platform as an opportunity to gain more information – since retailers could use that information to sell their products – they would naturally compel people to give more information. Let’s take it one step further. You download an app that requests access to your friends list, it can detect who your best friend is or a family member because you have suggested it (I can see who last viewed my Facebook profile in less than ten seconds just by scanning through sources codes). It can also detect which page you visit the most  by using more refined systems and together, they can create a personalised facial composite using advanced software of your family or friends, whereby the image of this ‘person’ – a mash between someone you know and someone you don’t know – is used as part of an advertising or marketing strategy that implicitly compels you to a product, because you are unconsciously attracted to the image of that person that happens to be someone that you know.[2]

The abuse of privacy is not uncommon, i.e., the recently exposed News International who hacked phones to obtain sensitive data – Rupert Murdoch being on friendly terms with the Liberal Government – and there currently stands no strict policies that would prevent or protect ourselves from abusers. Whilst I could, in this instance, begin discoursing on the social contract theory and perhaps the rather calculating, Orwellian agenda where society has gradually sacrificed their privacy and freedom for the sake of ‘national security’, in principle the disclosure of even the most basic information that we supply can be used against us. I can say that capitalism and globalisation is at the very heart that compels one to disclose information openly and freely. The incredibly narcissistic marketing stratagems tell us to conform, to not care about privacy, to avoid forming our own opinion, even what we think we should desire, unconsciously manipulating the decision-making process through the inducement of receiving positive things whether it is material, or friends, or popularity, sexual pleasure etc. &c., that we end up buying products that we don’t even need or want. People will eventually believe that material determinism is the only truth when in fact they have unconsciously been told to give up their own autonomy, that we are already living in a ‘A Spacetime Odyssey’ in that the very technological mechanisms we created to advance are – ‘the root of its own destruction’ – actually working against us.

In 1996, the Australian Law Reform Commission published Open Government – A Review of the Federal Freedom of Information Act 1982 (ALRC Report 77) designed with the intent on ensuring the principles of public scrutiny and the accountability of government that encapsulates the quality of democracy is applied viz. the objective of the act itself. “The FOI Act provides a right of access to information in the possession of government departments and agencies. The fundamental reason for providing this right is to ensure open and accountable government.”[3] The publication confirmed the necessity to improve the quality of the decision making process that citizens should possess and as a consequence access to information is a criteria of democracy. Whilst democracy itself is ambiguous in definition, particularly since it poses intractable theoretical issues that limits its conceptual interpretation, broadly speaking the minimalist view of what constitutes a democracy can be defined as the ‘participation of all adult members of society, freedom to formulate and advocate political alternatives, and the credible availability of political alternatives.”[4] During the developmental stages of FOI legislation in the late 1970’s, the Senate committee reported that the significance of implementing FOI laws was to ensure that individuals have access to what information the government may have and to have the capacity to correct what they consider to be misleading; in doing so, it will enhance the transparency of the government and ultimately a community better informed can participate democratically in a more effective manner.”[5] Thus, the Freedom of Information Act 1982, an “Act to give to members of the public rights of access to official documents of the Government of the Commonwealth and of its agencies”[6] was put to force.

Whilst initially accessible, over time the administrative process became problematic and overwhelmed, particularly attributable to compliance. Accordingly, it was recommended by the ALRC[7] that a new statutory position of an FOI Commissioner to act as an “independent person to monitor and promote the FOI Act”[8] should function to ensure compliance with the FOI Act and to raise the profile of the agency to the public through the improvement of the decision-making process. At the time there existed no independent person committed to act and contribute to resolving any difficulties that the agency experienced. Thus in 2010 the freedom of information reforms were implemented by the Australian government particularly concerning the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (FOI Act) and among those reforms included the appointment of the Australian Information Commissioner supported by statutory officers, namely the Privacy Commissioner and the Freedom of Information Commissioner, both appointing Mr. Timothy Pilgrim and Dr. James Popple for a term of five years.[9] Appeals for any rejected FOI claims that previously were dealt by the Administration Appeals Tribunal (AAT) and were in addition an expensive and lengthy process can now be made directly to the Commissioner that ultimately reduced the backlog and turnaround times. It will additionally aid agency compliance, whereby “[t]he reported cost attributable to agency compliance with the FOI Act was $41.719m, an increase of 14.9% on the previous year.”[10]

However, in the budget release of 2014-2015, the Abbott government withdrew the funds necessary to maintain the OAIC with the intention of disbanding the agency by the 31 December 2014. This was challenged by parliament since legislation with the intent of abolishing OAIC was not passed and consequently funds contributing to the agency were partially reinstated in the 2015-2016 budget. The initial objective was to transfer functions over to the Attorney-General Department and the Commonwealth Ombudsman who were already enabled with the powers to exercise the same powers of the OAIC.[11] This is where the controversy lies, that without the approval of parliament for this decision, it has in point of fact exposed a deficit amid the separation of powers and the function of the executive branch of government. The withdrawal of funding and the intent to legislate the abolishment of the OAIC nevertheless appears to be a practice implemented previously. In September 2013, the Climate Commission funding was removed by the Abbott budgetary changes prior to the implementation of its abolishment by parliament.[12] This confirms that the process of abolishing depends ultimately by parliament to be sure but the progression by procedurally defunding prior to any legislative changes confirms that there exists a rather discomforting executive system that stands on a thin line between the required separation of powers.  The doctrine of the separation of powers is a concept that ensures accountability and strengthens the checks and balances through the constitution necessary to ensure a fair and just governance of citizens. Simplified, the legislature enacts, executive applies and the judiciary interprets the law and since the rigidity of the body of rules once enforced is binding, therein requires the appropriate checks that ensure the law is beneficial to society as constitutionally implied, to prohibit and regulate to the effect of protecting and enabling Australian citizens and for the “peace, order, and good government of the Commonwealth.”[13]

Thus, to what extent does the removal of a regulator and a specialist low-cost review body undercut the benefits of the 2010 reforms to the Commonwealth FOI regime? The difficulties experienced by the commissioners due to budget cuts is perhaps sufficient enough to show the difficulties they experience performing the key functions of the agency, particularly with the effectiveness that it previously achieved. This is no doubt the reasons behind liberal government’ intent to close down the Commission, since the commissioners have been successful in a very short space of time in changing the structure and processes that have simplified accessibility to Australians and facilitated transparency as the original 1982 FOI Act had purposed. For instance, a strong emphasis on interagency networking all of which are subjected to the act and publications used as part of its information policy was resourcefully published and built, working on reforms implemented viz. the publication of information, “including information about what the agency does and why it does it.”[14] In addition, the resolution of complaints that would otherwise remained fixed in a backlog of lengthy and expensive was significantly questioned and ultimately reduced allowing public access to information that would have remained locked in a loophole. The costs involved to appeal decisions particularly related to public interest cases prohibit the rights of many due to their incapacity to financially afford the associated costs. A recent and landmark decision viz., the ruling in Bare v Independent Broad-based Anti-Corruption Commission exposed this problem, whereby the Supreme Court of Victoria granted a protective cost order that limited the costs of Nassir Bare, a 17 year old Ethiopian man who was assaulted by police.[15] Mr. Bare sought his right to have an independent body from the Victoria Police – the distrust that a fair and equitable assessment is clear since Mr. Bare himself was assaulted leaving chipped teeth and cuts along his jaw and thus breaching Section 38(1) of the Victorian Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities – and when consulting the IBAC, the latter deciding not to investigate the claim. Accordingly, public interest is tested and determined when public interest substantially outweighs the entity in question[16] and the court therefore ruled that costs associated with the case do not exceed a maximum of $5000 to allow Mr. Bare to continue with the proceedings.

The costs associated with FOI cases vis-à-vis the principle of the right to freely access information by public bodies establishes a reluctance by a significant portion of those attempting to access information and thus limits or excludes the disclosure of information. A report by the Australian Information Commissioner Prof. John McMillan highlighted the issues related to the scale of charges and the required simplification of its framework.[17] That is to say that to prevent burdens reaching to an unmanageable state, limitations to accessing documents is applied through both the ambiguous practical refusal mechanism under the former ss 24[18] of the FOI Act, along with the power to impose charges.[19] While it is clear that either a full or partial waiver of associated charges for those experiencing financial hardship are taken into account, what is considered ‘financial hardship’ indeed, what is considered ‘public interest’ itself required a more thorough definition to assist agencies with determining on a case by case basis the exemption of applicable fees.[20] The success of the commissioners indeed has caused wide-eyed nervousness amongst more than one quarter in the liberal camp, no doubt the reasons behind the attempt to shut them down as abruptly as they intended. What exactly is it that they have to hide that they sit in trepidation that disclosure of information on matters of public importance is now becoming more efficient? Are the tests that facilitate transparency going to be too transparent?

[1] §61 Australian Constitution, to execute and maintain the constitution and the laws
[2] Sonam Samat. “Visceral Targeting: Using Personalized Face Composites for Implicitly Targeted Marketing” 11 October, 2013.
[3] ARLC 77, 2.2
[4] Sylvia Chan, Liberalism, Democracy and Development, Cambridge University Press, (2002) 10
[5] ARLC 77
[6] The Freedom of Information Act 1982 (FOI Act)
[7] ARLC 77
[8] ARLC 77, 6.4
[9] Freedom of Information Amendment (Reform) Act 2010
[10] Dr James Popple, “Message from the Freedom of Information Commissioner” OAIC Annual Report 2011-2012
[11] Office of the Australian Information Commissioner PBS,  §1.1 p471
[12] Thomas J. Goreau, Ronal W. Larson, Joanna Campe, Geotherapy: Innovative Methods of Soil Fertility Restoration, Carbon Sequestration, and Reversing CO2 Increase, CRC Press (2014) 580
[13] The Australian Constitution, 1900 §52(i)
[14] Freedom of Information Amendment (Reform) Act 2010 (NO. 51, 2010) – Schedule 2: Division 1, §7A
[15] Bare v Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission & Ors [2015] VSCA 197
[16] For instance, see Privacy Amendment (Private Sector) Bill 2000 (Cth) Part VI, §72: 2(b)
[17] Prof. John McMillan, Review of charges under the Freedom of Information Act 1982: Report to the Attorney-General, February 2012
[18] This is no longer applicable.
[19] Review of Freedom of Information Legislation: Submission to the Hawke Review, December 2012: Section 198
[20] Freedom of Information Act 1982 – ss11B

That Awkward Moment in Turkish Politics

Perhaps I am being somewhat suspicious but well after a decade of factitious ideological politics, the recent failed coup in Turkey could almost be considered theatrical, a prominent show of untruths entwined within truths that one can no longer differentiate between the two. The ‘truth’ itself – whatever that may be – may just be too daunting to face that the majority would subconsciously prefer and even deliberately avoid confronting it so as to maintain a sense of serenity that divisive politics affords the ignorant. That is, othering imparts a sense of relief for many who require tangible justifications for their subjective foolhardiness. Subjectivity being intangible requires conventional points of reference so that feelings – such as fear – make sense and become transferrable, often to blind submission either implemented by politics or society, or hatred because of individual evil. Whilst people may call it determinism, they choose whether consciously or not (the unconscious mind is still a form of consciousness) to paradoxically never choose, that is, they choose to be slaves.

This schism of opinions that stand either for or against Recep Tayyip Erdogan – current president of Turkey and former Prime Minister – is riddled with suspicions, distrust against him and his party, distrust for his intentions to control the military, distrust that a gradual implementation of Islamic culture is being enforced despite Turkey’s history since the time of Kemal Ataturk. Blaming cleric Fethullah Gülen for the coup, lashing out against the CIA among many other ridiculous displays held in the media – a media said to be controlled by Erdogan himself of which I will explain a little later – the coup being botched by an elite, world-class military experienced in coups makes one really wonder about what is going on. The Justice and Development Party (AKP) emerged as a saviour during a difficult economic and social time in Turkey, encouraging the prospect that they can embrace both Islam and Democracy under the banner of human rights and freedoms and effectively implement reforms to complete the Copenhagen criteria toward EU accession. These reforms included legislative changes through amendments of the constitution underlined by the strengthening of an independent judiciary and the advancement of freedoms and cultural rights. As said by Erdogan himself, “one of the greatest common denominators of mankind’s existence on earth is the development of humanistic values over centuries. Universal values that are embodied in the concept of democracy and supported by principles such as human rights, rule of law, good governance are the product of the collected wisdom derived from different civilisations.”[1] Such discourse on responsibility and gaining prominence by acting as an example in a complex global environment has consistently been reiterated by the AKP and while constitutional reforms along with a number of ratified international conventions have since taken place, the current social and political dynamics prove such discourses to have been nothing but mere flatteries without weight to the mechanisms that strengthen the principles of human rights. The almost schizophrenic movement between an uncompromising, conservative paternalism with the conservative-moderate political model appears to be a type of Newtons Cradle between a want for EU accession and an opportunity to strengthen a neo-Ottoman agenda. The AKP has either way attempted to strengthen legitimacy by showcasing popular domestic support and representing themselves as significant actors of democracy and human rights, an image recently proven by social media to be fictitious. While it is evident that media representation of the party is one-sided with Turkey becoming notorious for arresting journalists and restricting the independence of journalism and the media in its entirety, social media has become an expressive platform to expose the discontent displayed by the population.

 

Historically, Turkey was born out of the ashes of a failing Ottoman Empire, the late nineteenth century initiated the beginnings of Turkish nationalism through Jöntürkler or the Young Turks, when the underlying complexity between “a territorial, an ethnic or a religious basis for the ‘nation’”[2] promoted discourse on political identity and what it meant to be ‘Turkish’. It was not long afterwards that the proclamation of the Turkish Republic headed by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk was established following intense international and domestic upheaval including the First World War, the Balkan Wars and the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, together with domestic strife such as the Sheik Said rebellion in the Eastern provinces. While the efforts and overall establishment of the Turkish parliament can be considered a success, the contradictory nationalist ideas particularly between Islamism and Turkism along with violence against ethnic and religious minorities proved the application of this new Turkish identity was initiated through an aggressive state nationalism in an attempt to submerge resistance.

As such, intense cultural and social transformations were implemented to change the structural dynamic of the new country from the old culture, the first being the abolishment of the caliphate that had been the primary system of governance in the region for centuries. Other instituted policies included the control of the appointments of imams, the abolishment of religious courts and schools, and other laws such as enacting the prohibition of any religious interference within the Grand National Assembly and Turkish politics.[3] While such political and cultural reforms no doubt had an impact on the calculated efforts to transform civic society and culture by strengthening loyalty to the new Turkish nationalism, the schism between secularists and Islamists proved the acceptance of the new ideology was indeed a complicated endeavour.

The one-party system changed in the late 1940’s toward a multi-party system and this process of democratisation exposed the broader Islamic sensibilities and cultural norms of the citizens. Consolidating the transformation toward democracy also allowed the country’s marginalised an avenue for political participation and thus this new opportunity never previously afforded to a public desirous to engage in a politics of identity became the basis of confrontational movements as part of this transformative process. Consequently, particularly during the late 1970’s, Turkey experienced serious social and political upheaval between what became known as the ‘leftists’ with the ‘rightists’.[4] With the propagation of Islamic nationalism by identifying Turkish nationalism with Pan-Turkic identity, an ultranationalist right-wing ideology founded by political leader Alparslan Turkeş and strengthened by the youth-wing (the terror organisation Grey Wolves), the determination to fight against what it saw as the growth of left-wing humanism escalated the violence.[5] Political parties such as the Aydinlar Ocaği or the Hearth of the Enlightened (AO) and the National Salvation Party (MSP) mobilised support and increased social turbulence. The evolution of the violence was amplified with the changes from a predominantly rural context toward an urban environment with mass population movements to the cities for employment causing poverty and squatter settlements. A ‘clash’ of various groups illustrated by serious street violence between the Alevi and Sunni, Kurdish, non-Turkish such as Muslims from the Balkans, Communists and right-wing Ultranationalists among others proved that espousing Turkish nationalism and identity within a democratic space clearly contained hostilities that had not been effectively uprooted.

This period of unrivalled turmoil led to the 1980 military coup d’état, whereby the Turkish military took control of the government and closed down political parties, banning leaders from political interference and revoking the constitution as part of its sweeping reforms of the country.[6] The intervention of the Turkish armed forces into social and political life during the most tumultuous period of its history can be viewed as both a breakthrough since the military are seen to have saved the country from an impending civil war and become the bastion of Kemalism, but in doing so implemented a harsh regiment of torture and extreme violence that found hundreds of thousands arrested, executed or dying in custody.[7] Recent developments found the final two surviving military leaders General Kenan Evren – who served as president during the junta – along with Tahsin Sahinkaya arrested and sentenced to life imprisonment for the brutality of the military during that period.[8] The several years of martial rule was an attempt to transition Turkish society and governance toward democratisation; the first and significant step required was a complete overhaul of the Turkish constitution and restoring a more effective civilian government.

Other changes included basic education of Islamic principles and morals,[9] whereby military authorities purported that religious education had been corrupted by leadership and as such became part of the cause of the political and civic violence. Additionally, neo-liberal economic reforms based on individualistic and profitable activities – perhaps unintentionally – developed as a causal effect from the trauma of the radical changes that were implemented during the military coup and as such an increase in political disengagement and fear of losing property and family members compelled a change in economic processes.[10] Military interference continued particularly during the 1990’s where ideological and ethnic violence reared its ugly head once again, particularly the PKK and the Kurdish-Turkish conflict, mass violence such as the Sivas massacre, along with “deep state” suspicions that led to the death of President Turgut Ozal with assassinations of important military and judicial figures. These suspicions have been solidified with the Ergenekon trials that found the indictment of apparent members of a clandestine secularist organisation that were secretly plotting against the Turkish government.[11] On the contrary, the Adelet ve Kalkinma Partisi [AKP], the popular centre-right political party founded by Recep Tayyip Erdogan has been consistently accused of implementing an Islamist agenda by addressing domestic lawmakers to execute changes against restrictions set by secular policies, foreign policy statements that imply a neo-Ottoman stance, and as said earlier, gradually restricting the power of the military that some imply to be a way to provide him with the freedom to continue strengthening this agenda hiding under the banner of international obligations toward EU accession.

It is essential to understand the influence media has with social life and thus arguably it’s often controversial relationship with politics since “almost everywhere in the world, most of the media is still politically differentiated along with general political orientations.”[12] To have named Fethullah Gülen, a Sufi preacher of peace and writer, the mastermind behind the coup and to label him a terrorist, whereby social media suddenly opened and went on the attack, is an expression of why identifying the nature of this relationship between politics and society is necessary. Ascertaining the degree of political influence and intervention on reporting and especially legal regulations that encourage partisan content through restrictions to freedom of expression is a model that can often be causally linked to the historical conditions of the country in question. Thus, in order to understand the distinct Turkish experience along with the necessary and proper conceptualisation of the failure to consolidate human rights norms at political and cultural level, it is essential to feature historical and social factors that influence and ultimately undermine the effective habituation of democratic principles. These have been factored into several important cleavages, which include 1. Military and beaurecratic elitism and the uneasy relationship with the citizens, 2. The schism between Sunni Islam and Shia Islam [primarily Alevi], 3. Dominant ethnic rivalries namely between the Kurds and the Turks.[13]

Thus the recent and tumultuous history of the country and the constant suspicions against the potential hidden intentions vis-à-vis political, ethnic or religious leanings is linked to the reservations raised against media communication and freedom of speech. It does not help that the polarisation of these ethnic and religious cleavages undermine the democratic transformation within Turkey, and that may be exactly what is wanted. The Ottoman past remains highly influential, clearly visible with the symbolic relationship between Turkey’s military and government with Turkey itself considered the father, a preference for a paternal and perhaps authoritarian management of civil affairs rather than democratic. Whilst defining ‘democracy’ is certainly ambiguous and perhaps to a degree the interpretation is relative to the customs and conventions in the context of each national government and its relationship with and regulation of its citizens, religious and ethnic cleavages rooted in Turkey’s unfavourable history that proves the acclimatisation of even the most basic tenets of democracy such as the structure and equitable distribution of executive powers along with the effective participation of and guaranteed rights of its citizens appears to have become crystallised in beaurecratic elitism, perhaps itself rooted in the former tradition of Ottoman centralism. While democratic progress and achievements have taken shape, they have nevertheless failed to consolidate culturally and appear superficial and at best mere “instruments of convenience.”[15]

Rooted in the current legal and political framework, not only is it clearly visible that political elites exercise a formulation of ownership policy that nevertheless manufactures independence and sincerity to pacify sceptics, Turkish media laws are also marked by a historical relationship with censorship policy that illustrates a continuation of civic suspicions. The onset of the Tanzimat period during the Ottoman Empire can be considered the commencement of press related activities with newspapers such as the French Bulletin des Nouvelles in 1795, the Turkish-Arabic Vakay-I Misryiye in 1828, and the first Turkish Takvim-I Vekayi in 1831 under the reign of Sultan Mahmud II being successfully published and circulated. Such activities only increased over time and eventually shaped the Matbaa Nizamnamesi (1857) that regulated printing houses and publishing materials. However, the fractured condition of the empire particularly during the reign of Abdul Hamid II [1842-1918] who imposed Draconian censorship against current affairs or any liberal political views, further censored the former press regulations whereby in 1909 it was replaced with Matbuat Kanunu [Press Law] and by extension was the continuation of the former regulations but with greater restrictions determined by the Ministry of the Interior and continued long after. “Böylece 45 yil yürürlükten kalan 1864 Matbuat Nizamnamesi;nin yerini alan ve 32 yil sonar 1931 Matbuat Kanunu’yla yürürlükten kalirilacak olan 1909 Matbuat Kanunu yayilanmiştir.”[16] The Hamidian system established the Domestic Press Directorate (Matbuati Dahiliye Müdiriyeti) that included, “a director with five assistants; five examining clerks (mümeyyiz); more than a dozen inspectors (müfettiş) responsible for supervision of newspapers, printing establishments and theatres,”[17] and rigorously examined content of the press and periodicals to ensure censorship both pre and post-publication. The regulations were arbitrary and lacked specificity or concrete guidelines, thus remained dependant on the examination and decisions of officials usually in the context of current affairs.[18]

Attention and discussions relating to the absence of Internet laws was realised in 1998 with the prosecution of 18-year-old Emre Ersöz, who mistakenly criticised the national police for the extreme and unnecessary violence against a group of blind protestors.[19] The charge itself was for “[p]ublicly insulting state security forces” on a Turkish forum Turknet[20] and he was prosecuted with a suspended sentence of ten months imprisonment under Article 159 of the Turkish Penal Code. Article 159 could at the time imprison for up to six years for publicly denigrating Turkishness. While Article 301 made a series of changes from Article 159, the ambiguity of the language and the uncertainty surrounding the interpretation of the clauses did not modify the potentially detrimental impact the code had on human rights and freedoms. Claudia Roth, the vice-president of the German-Turkish Inter-parliamentary Friendship Group and Germany’ Greens politician stated that the death of Armenian-Turkish Journalist Hrant Dink is linked to Article 301 of the Turkish Penal code, as the latter strengthens nationalism.[21] Nationalism, freedom of expression and human rights have remained key issues vis-à-vis Turkey’s democratisation process, with remnants of the past, global culture and modernisation together with religion, civic and ethnic nationalisms all playing a role in the popular attitudes and mobility – or lack thereof – of the population.

On one end, there certainly does appear a risk to security with the continued conflict of ideological positions between ethnic and religious groups that unlike more liberal and democratic countries where such freedom of expression could have little direct impact or consequence, the risk of violence in Turkey appears to be much higher. For instance, the Sivas Massacre found 35 dead after Islamic Salafists set fire to a hotel where Alevi intellectuals were holding a cultural festival, one such intellectual purporting to have organised a discussion on the Satanic verses by Salman Rushdie.[22] In the case of Gündüz V Turkey[23] at the European Court of Human Rights, Müslüm Gündüz campaigned on live television for the implementation of Sharia laws and criticised secularism, with the court finding it favour of Gündüz (under article 10 of the convention) defending Sharia without inciting violence cannot be considered hate speech, his criminal conviction of two years imprisonment under Turkish law thus in violation of ECHR.[24] The margins of defending Sharia, which is known for intolerance and having the potential impact of inciting violence and hatred expresses the difficulty of ascertaining what justifies as hate speech according to the history and culture of a country like Turkey. The Sivas Massacre – where police and fire brigades that were at the scene during the incident, did little to protect, prevent or assist – highlights the impact and the risk public communication has in Turkey and the lack of human right commitments at a social and cultural level. Censorship can in addition also ensure that young people are not exposed to content or information that could be detrimental to their wellbeing, that racial vilification and hate speech is controlled as well as reduce crimes such as violations of copyright laws, rampant spamming and other security concerns.

On the other hand, however, the restrictive line to freedom of speech and communication is crossed when too much government control begins to limit access to information, hindering websites and removing content and thus inhibiting knowledge and current affairs. For instance, failure to highlight or broadcast activities that prove political opposition or that criticise governance and legislation. This suspicion that the liberalisation of the press had been infiltrated by political influence was solidified with the recent Gezi Park Protests in Istanbul that caused domestic and international outrage at the handling of peaceful protesters, a story rarely mentioned on popular television broadcasters in Turkey during the tumult. Prior to the enactment of internet censorship Law No. 5651, media reports on child pornography was sweeping that some claim was intentional to ensure support for the law, as it “came across as an orchestrated effort.”[25] In addition, there are growing concerns at the censorship and restrictions against journalists and a liberal and independent media, with many journalists losing their jobs amid political pressure and yet others being arrested or targeted in arbitrary prosecutions under anti-terrorism legislation [Law 3713]. Turkey has become notorious for being a country arresting local and international journalists and while state control of the media is not new, the AKP agenda has intensified. “There has been state influence on journalists in Turkey for decades, but the situation has deteriorated, in three ways, since the AKP won second term in 2007… by abusing the legal framework to criminalize Kurdish journalists, by instrumentalizing a major political investigation – Ergenekon – to prosecute dissenting journalists, and by exploiting its economic relationships with media conglomerates to engender self-censorship in the press.”[26]

The Radio and Television Supreme Council (RTÜK) have been noted to place pressure on channels that are critical against the government and Turkey’s major broadcaster TRT is known for remaining one-sided and propagandist toward the AKP. CNN Turkey 5N1K program terminated journalist Murat Aksoy’ position, for instance, following his comment that the AKP should investigate corruption.[27] In 2000, the Telecommunications Authority under Law No. 4502 was established due to local and international pressure to liberalise the telecommunications industry, however legal provisions expose a failure to safeguard independence and political interference, which is clearly visible with the provision that purports members of the board are appointed by the council of ministers.[28] During this period, a draft bill attempting to regulate internet publications by including it under the same umbrella of legal restrictions that was already governing television broadcasting, print media and radio had risen to the fore and while controversy arose during this period, by 2002 amendments to Law No. 4676 were passed that included regulations vis-à-vis internet publications.[29] The monopoly between the state, private media companies and the economic value media has neglected to focus on interests of the public or human rights and freedoms. By 2007, Law No. 5651 on the Regulation of Publications on the Internet and Suppression of Crimes Committed by means of such publications came to force and access to sites – including Youtube – were consequently blocked or regulated. The law itself provided a catalogue of crimes along with the legal and procedural framework during the investigation and consequent banning of a website, attempting to work within the configuration of the Budapest Convention of Cybercrime, an international treaty that attempts to regulate internet and computer crime (only signed by Turkey in 2014). The catalogue of crimes include the Incitement to suicide (TCK-84), sexual abuse of children (TCK-103), facilitation of the use of narcotics (TCK-190), provision of substances harmful to health (TCK-194), obscenity (TCK-226), prostitution (TCK-227), facilitation of gambling (TCK-228), crimes against Ataturk (Law 5816 for defamation as defined in Article 125 of Turkish Criminal Law) and gambling (under sports law).[30] In addition, Turkey’s Telecommunications Directorate [TIB] was granted the authority to block access to websites without a court order and the scope of what and the reasons behind the banning has not been publically or adequately supplied.

In 2011, a major domestic project was implemented that required all internet users to select a profile [family, standard, domestic, child] as an attempt to filter websites linked to the profile choice.[31] This caused demonstrations against privacy in major cities and the obligatory requirement was eventually changed to a voluntary one. In 2014, amendments to Law No. 5651 was ratified primarily because of the outpour of discontent across Turkey during the Gezi Park protests. It was in the same year that Erdogan vowed to eradicate Twitter, what he referred to as a “menace” to society[32] and such discourse and eventual implementation parallels the AKP political identity of power and legitimacy both locally and internationally. It ensured harsher regulations against social networking and a faster process to ban web content, failing to follow correct procedural consultations as is oft required when amending or passing new laws. In 2015, further amendments continued when the internet became a medium to expose corrupt political officials and other high profile scandals with changes to internet defamation.[33]

From an international human rights scope, several problems are exposed when assessing social media and censorship in Turkey. The first and perhaps primary question is whether social media itself is a human right. The choice to follow and have access to information, to choose your associations and the value the interactive platform has to expression is essential to the rights articulated in International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights. Social networking sites are not public forums in that they are privately controlled and therefore the topic of human rights vis-à-vis social media falls primarily under the banner of freedom of expression, association and information and as such the exercise of such rights carries responsibilities. During the 2011 London Riots, however, where thousands looted and set fire to property in London and other towns following the death of 29 year old Mark Duggan by police, questions were introduced as to the potential of blocking social media in an otherwise Western and liberal country.[34] David Cameron explored the possibility of blocking social media such as twitter, facebook and other internet communication technologies during times of civil unrest.[35] As emphasised earlier, it raises a difficult problem between human rights and national security. For instance, while Turkey ratified the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms that includes articles which safeguard freedom of expression and the prevention of interference by public authorities, it is essential to point that that 10.2 of the article states that the exercise of such freedoms may be subject to restrictions or penalties as prescribed by the law in the interest of national security, territorial integrity and public safety. Thus, there continues to remain the difficulty of interpreting the agenda and the ambiguity of language used in Turkish law that assess what warrants restrictions and perhaps the reason why accountability and transparency remain vital to the integrity of a democratic society. Accordingly, 80,000 websites as of May 2015 have been banned in Turkey[36] with the reasons behind the decisions lacking clarity and while regulation to the internet may have been necessary to protect the security of the state, it should be within the limitations set by international human rights principles. This lack of clarity has unfortunately made it difficult to ascertain whether the plurality and independence of the media is in serious jeopardy, relying on international cases to outline whether the restrictions are justifiable. There have been a number of cases against Turkey breaching Article 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights. One such case was Ürper and Others V Turkey[37] where the publication and distribution of a series of newspapers were restricted under section 6(5) of Law no. 3713 (the Prevention of Terrorism Act) for disseminating propaganda[38] due to alleged connections or sympathies with the PKK (Kurdish Workers Party). The European Court of Human Rights found in favour of Ürper and Others[39] that the government failed to safeguard freedom of the press. The suspension of their newspapers even for short periods had an impact on the value of the information it intended on supplying.[40]

The bridges between moral laws and democracy have often co-existed on shaky grounds, particularly in Islamic countries. While Turkey views itself as a champion of synthesising Islam with Democracy, the recent events particularly the Gezi Park protests demonstrates that this is not the case. When one considers the power the military has in Turkey being the second largest NATO army to date, to stage a coup that fails as badly as it did in Turkey raises many questions. As Turkey maintains this important and determined separation between religion and a secular government with the Turkish military the backbone to the Kemalist agenda, penetrating and ultimately challenging the separation of powers could leap Turkey into the authoritarian realm that many secularists fear Erdogan is attempting to achieve. Democracy sets the political foundation for the establishment of human rights and fundamental freedoms, raising the problem of whether Islam and Democracy is mutually exclusive or compatible. Social media has thus become a symbol of the right to expression and to obtain information from sources otherwise unavailable in Turkey and the Arab World and itself a voice of democracy. The separation of religion from state has been an ongoing problem, John Locke writing about the social contract theory and why absolute power and governance fails to protect natural liberties. “For no government can have a right to obedience from a people who have not freely consented to it.”[41] Freedom of expression has been one of the key issues in Turkey’s democratisation process. The European Court of Human Rights has found Turkey in violation of the European Convention on Human Rights in a number of cases and the laws of internet censorship contains provisions that continue to violate fundamental freedoms. While legislation against public denigration is not something that is unique to Turkey, with Italy, Poland, Spain and Germany also regulating and convicting under similar laws,[42] variations in the application and interpretation of these laws exist in part from the legal and political history and cultural attitudes of the country in question. This is clearly visible with Article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code relating to the criminalisation against those that denigrate Turkishness, the Republic and institutions and organs of the state. The ambiguous nature of the term ‘Turkishness’ and the various interpretations and definitions particularly by political parties and institutions prove the controversial nature of the term. In addition, justifiable terms that inhibit human rights in the name of security, such as prosecuting freedom of speech under ‘terrorism’ laws is in itself dangerous territory. The lack of transparency as to the number of sites blocked and the reasons ascertaining the ban is certainly not clear, making it difficult to correctly assess and analyse the justifications behind the blockage or ban. If there exists a chance of uniting democratic ideals with religious, economic and political standards, human rights and freedom of expression remains the key component, with social media standing at the forefront of this symbolic unison.

 

 

 

[1] Recep Tayyip Erdogan, “Conservative Democracy and the Globalization of Freedom” Speech at the American Enterprise Institute (January 29, 2004)

[2] Hugh Poulton, Top Hat, Grey Wolf and the Crescent: Turkish Nationalism and the Turkish Republic, New York University Press (1997) 315

[3] Tuğrul Ansay, Don Wallace, Introduction to Turkish Law, Kluwer Law International (2011) 52

[4]Meltem Müftüler-Bac, Yannis A. Stivachtis, Turkey-European Union Relations: Dilemmas, Opportunities, and Constraints, Lexington Books (2008) 304

[5] Gerald MacLean, Abdullah Gul and the Making of the New Turkey, Oneworld Publications (2014)

[6] Elifcan Karacan, Remembering the 1980 Turkish Military Coup d‘État: Memory, Violence, and Trauma, Springer (2015) 139

[7]According to statistics, 650,000 citizens were arrested and taken into custody, with 230,000 placed on trial. 517 were sentenced to the death penality and 50 executed by hanging, along with 299 prisoners dying from ‘unknown’ causes. See The Mobilization of Political Islam in Turkey by Banu Elgur, (2010) 90

[8] Robert B Durham, False Flags, Covert Operations, & Propaganda (2014) 348

[9] Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı Din Bilgisi Oğretimi (Ankara, September 1981). Op. Cit., Hugh Poulton, 181.

[10] Op. Cit., Elifcan Karacan, 162

[11]Ebru Canan-Sokullu, Debating Security in Turkey: Challenges and Changes in the Twenty-First Century, Rowman & Littlefield (2013) 86

[12] Rasit Kaya and Baris Cakmur, “Politics and the Mass Media in Turkey,” Turkish Studies, (Vol 11:4) 521-537, December 2010

[13] Nevzat Soguk (1993) A study of the historico cultural reasons for turkey’s ‘inconclusive’ democracy, New Political Science, 13:1, 89-116,

[15] Ibid.

[16] Doç. Dr. Nurşen Mazici, “1930’a Kadar Basinin Durumu ve 1931 Matbuat Kanunu”, Akdeniz Üniversitesi Fen-Edebiyat Fakültesi Tarih Bölümü Öğretim Üyesi. 1 E Ji. Carr, Tarih Nedir? İletişim Yayınlan, İst. (1987), s.41 137

[17] Carter Vaughn Findley, Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire: The Sublime Porte, 1789-1922, Princeton University Press (2012) 253

[18] Ottoman Press: from Tanzimat to early Young Turk period (1830s-1909)

[19]The World Bank, The Right to Tell: The Role of Mass Media in Economic Development, Roumeen Islam (2002) 212

[20]Turkish Teenager Sentenced for Internet Comments; HDN, 6/3/1998:

http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-teenager-sentenced-for-internet-comments.aspx?pageID=438&n=turkish-teenager-sentenced-for-internet-comments-1998-06-03

[21] 301 Concerns Resurface During Dink Trials, October 02, 2007:

http://www.todayszaman.com/national_301-concerns-resurface-in-dink-trial_123655.html

[22] Kenneth Christie, Ethnic Conflict, Tribal Politics: A Global Perspective, Psychology Press (1998) 167

[23] Case of Gündüz V Turkey, ECHR, 14/11/2000.

[24]Jane Boulden & Will Kymlicka, International Approaches to Governing Ethnic Diversity, Oxford University Press (2015) 29

[25]Melih Kırlıdoğ and Mustafa Akgül, “Internet censorship in Turkey” Internet Policy Review (Vol 4:2) 2015

[26]Natalie Martin, Security and the Turkey-EU Accession Process: Norms, Reforms and the Cyprus Issue, Palgrave Macmillan (2015) 171

[27]Journalist from pro-government daily fired over TV comments, Jan 12, 2014: http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/journalist-from-pro-government-daily-fired-over-tv-comments.aspx?pageID=238&nID=60943&NewsCatID=341

[28] Article 8 of Law No. 2813

[29]Jostein Gripsrud, Lennart Weibull, Media, Markets & Public Spheres: European Media at the Crossroads, Intellect Books (2010) 184

[30] Yaman Akdeniz, Report of the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media on Turkey and Internet Censorship, Organization for the Security and Cooperation in Europe

[31] Eda Çataklar, Decision of the Internet Authority Concerning Internet Security and Access Restriction, IRIS (2011) 7:1/45

[32] Bissera Zankova, Andrej Školkay, Iliana Franklin, Smart Journalism, lulu.com, 128

[33] New Law to Further Tighten Turkey’s Internet Control, January 24 (2015) Today’s Zaman http://www.todayszaman.com/anasayfa_new-law-to-further-tighten-turkeys-internet-control_370721.html

[34] BBC News, England riots: Government mulls social media controls (11 August 2011):

http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-14493497.

[35] Ibid.

[36] Op. Cit., Melih Kırlıdoğ and Mustafa Akgül

[37] Ürper and Others v. Turkey, (Applications nos. 14526/07, 14747/07, 15022/07, 15737/07, 36137/07, 47245/07, 50371/07, 50372/07 and 54637/07), Chamber Judgment of 20.10.2009, paras 39-45.

[38] §6(2) and §7(2) of Law no. 3713, as well as Articles 215 and 218 of the Criminal Code

[39] Article 44 §2 of the Convention

[40] Op. Cit., Jane Boulden and Will Kymlicka

[41] John Locke, Second Treatise of Government, §192

[42] Louis-Léon Christians, Expert workshop on the prohibition of incitement to national, racial or religious hatred, Study for the workshop on Europe (9 and 10 February 2011, Vienna).